Uniform Civil Code needs to become a reality: MP HC
Babushahi Bureau
Chandigarh, July 22, 2024:
The Madhya Pradesh High Court Bench at Indore has reiterated what even the Apex Court had underscored in the past in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled X Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Another in Misc. Criminal Case No. 57067 of 2021 that was pronounced as recently as on July 16, 2024 has minced just no words to state in no uncertain terms that the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) must not remain on paper alone and needs to become a reality. The Single Judge Bench comprising of Justice Anil Verma minced just no words to point out that there are a lot of other deprecating, fundamentalist, superstitious and ultra-conservative practices prevalent in the society that are clothed in the name of faith and belief. The Bench further very rightly added that, “Though the Constitution of India already encapsulates Article 44 that advocates a uniform civil code for the citizens, yet the same needs to become a reality not just on paper. A well-drafted uniform civil code could serve as a check on such superstitious and evil practices and would strengthen the integrity of the nation.”
The Bench made these key observations in its noteworthy judgment on a petition that had sought quashing of an FIR that was registered against the accused under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code and provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act and the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. The complainant had accused her husband, mother-in-law and sister-in-law of harassment for dowry. She also alleged that she was beaten up by the accused and her husband had uttered ‘talaq’ thrice. While very strongly deprecating triple talaq, the Indore High Court Bench underscored the dire need of uniform civil code to become a reality in our country. Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Justice Anil Verma of Indore Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth precisely in para 1 stating that, “Petitioners have preferred this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “Cr.P.C.”) for quashment of the FIR bearing Crime No.272/2021 registered at P.S. Rajpur, District Badwani (M.P.) for the offences punishable under Section 498- A, 323/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”), Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 (in short Act of 2019) as well as all the consequential proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajpur in RCT No.376/2020 thereto.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 while dwelling on the facts of the case that, “Brief facts of the case are that the complainant/respondent No.2 XX lodged an FIR at P.S. Rajpur, District Badwani against the present petitioners and her husband XX XXX by stating that her Nikah was taken place with the accused XX on 15.4.2019, as per the Muslim rites and rituals. Petitioner No.1 . X XX is her mother-in-law and petitioner No.2 XX XXX is her sister-in-law. After the marriage her husband, mother-in-law and sister-in-law physically and mentally harassed her for demand of dowry. They pressurized her to bring Rs.2 Lakh from her parents. When she denied, then the petitioners and her husband used to beat her by using kicks and fists. Thereafter her husband uttered ‘Talaq’ thrice and kicked her out. Since then she is living with her parents at Badwani. Thereafter she lodged FIR against the petitioners and her husband. Accordingly offences under Section 498-A, 323/34 of IPC, Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and Section 4 of the Act of 2019 has been registered against the present petitioners and husband of respondent No.2.”
The Bench discloses in para 3 that, “Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the alleged offence has been committed within the jurisdiction of the Mumbai Court, therefore, P.S. Rajpur is not having any jurisdiction to register the FIR in question. Provisions of Section 4 of the Act of 2019 is applicable only against the Muslim husband and not against the in-laws. Omnibus allegations have been levelled against the petitioners for demand of dowry. FIR has been lodged with a huge delay of more than 14 months. No such incident has taken place. No date of such incident has been shown in the FIR. Petitioner No.2 is the sister-in-law of the complainant. Being a married lady she is living separately along with her husband and children at her matrimonial house. She has no occasion to regularly visit at her parent’s home. Respondent No.2 and his brother always used to misbehave with the petitioner No.1. No offence is made out against the petitioners under Section 498-A, 323/34 of IPC. Hence, he prays for quashment of the FIR and all the consequential proceedings thereto.”
On the contrary, the Bench then states in para 4 that, “Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.1/State opposes the prayer and prays for its rejection by submitting that on the basis of FIR reveals harassment and demand made by the petitioners, therefore, it is not a fit case for quashment of FIR.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 7 that, “Learned counsel for the petitioners firstly raised a legal contention regarding the jurisdiction of the trial court by stating that as per the FIR the entire alleged offence has been done in Machchhi Market, Chirag Nagar, Ghatkopar, West Mumbai (Maharashtra) and no part of crime has been committed at the jurisdiction of P.S. Rajpur. Therefore, Police Station Rajpur is having no jurisdiction to register the said FIR.”
Needless to say, the Bench specifies in para 8 that, “It is a settled position of law that “ordinary rule” engrafted in Section 177 of Cr.P.C. by allowing courts in another local area to take cognizance of the offence. In addition, if an offence committed in one locality is repeated in another, the courts in the other location are competent to hear the case. If an offence is committed in another jurisdiction as a result of the consequences of a criminal act, the court in that jurisdiction is likewise competent to take cognizance under Section 179. As a result, if an offence is committed in part in one location and part in another, the exception to the “ordinary rule” would be attracted if the offence is a continuing offence or if the consequences of a criminal act result in an offence being committed at a different location, and the courts within whose jurisdiction the criminal act is committed would lose exclusive jurisdiction to try the offence.”
While citing the relevant case law, the Bench propounds in para 9 that, “The Supreme Court 3 judge bench in the case of Rupali Devi Vs. State of U.P. (2019) 5 SCC 384, the court observed that “Courts in the location where the wife seeks refuge after fleeing or being driven from the matrimonial home due to acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives also have jurisdiction to hear a complaint alleging commission of offences under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.” Judgment in the case of Rupali Devi (supra) is a landmark that settled the conflict regarding the jurisdiction of the court from which a victim of domestic violence can file a case. It resolved all existing doubts regarding the jurisdiction of courts in the parental house.”
While citing yet another relevant case law, the Bench observes in para 18 that, “In the case of Ramveer Upadhyay and Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr. passed in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2953 of 2022, Apex Court has held as under:-
“.....Whether the allegations are true or untrue, would have to be decided in the trial. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. ....”.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 19 that, “Thus, it is crystal clear that Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been incorporated to prevent abuse of process of law and not to encourage the offence. This court cannot make roving inquiry at this stage, but if the uncontroverted allegations do not make any offence, only then this Court can quash the FIR. Therefore, the claim of the petitioner that there is no evidence available against them cannot be accepted at this stage.”
The Bench notes in para 20 that, “In view of the prima facie evidence available on record against the petitioners, this Court is of the considered opinion that this petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. deserves to be partly allowed only in respect of the offence under Section 4 of the Act of 2019. But in view of the prima facie evidence available on record, it is not a fit case where this Court can exercise the power conferred under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash all other offences registered against the petitioners.”
Most significantly and most forthrightly, the Bench minces just no words absolutely to encapsulate in para 21 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that, “This matter pertains to the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. Triple talaq is a serious issue. However, this Court before parting with the judgment, finds it necessary to make the following observations:-
(i) Talaq is a word used in Muslim personal Law for divorce, denoting dissolution of marriage, when a Muslim man severs all marital ties with his wife. Under the Muslim law, Triple Talaq simply means liberty from the relationship of marriage in instant and irrevocable, where the man, by simply uttering the word ‘talaq thrice, is able to end his marriage. This kind of instantaneous divorce is called Triple Talaq, also known as ‘talaq-e-biddat.’’ It is obvious that in Talaq-e-Biddat or triple talaq, the marriage could be broken within seconds and the clocks cannot be turned back. Unfortunately this right lies only with the husband and even the husband wants to correct his mistake it is the women who has to face the atrocities of nikah halala.
(ii) In the celebrated case of Shayara Bano Vs. Union of India and others (AIR 2017 SC 4609) the practice of Triple Talaq has already been declared illegal by the Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court. The law against Triple Talaq has been enacted to give matrimonial justice and protection to the women of Muslim community. Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2019, was passed by the Indian Parliament as a law, to make instant Triple Talaq a criminal offence. It is definitely a great move towards equality and social amendments. It took many years for the Law makers to realise that triple talaq is unconstitutional and bad for society. We should now realise the need for a “Uniform Civil Code” in our country.
(iii) There are a lot of other deprecating, fundamentalist, superstitious and ultra-conservative practices prevalent in the society that are clothed in the name of faith and belief. Though the Constitution of India already encapsulates Article 44 that advocates a uniform civil code for the citizens, yet the same needs to become a reality not just on paper. A well-drafted uniform civil code could serve as a check on such superstitious and evil practices and would strengthen the integrity of the nation.”
As a corollary, the Bench then directs in para 22 that, “Accordingly this petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is partly allowed and the FIR bearing Crime No.272/2021 registered at P.S. Rajpur, District Badwani (M.P.) in respect of the offences punishable under Section 3/4 of the Act of 2019 against both the petitioners are hereby quashed, but the trial Court is directed to proceed in the trial against the petitioners in respect of the other remaining offences except offences under Section 3/4 of the Act of 2019.”
Finally and for sake of clarity, the Bench then concludes by aptly holding in para 23 that, “Before parting with the order, it is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. The trial Court shall continue the trial against petitioners without being influenced or prejudiced by the observations made in this order.”