Balochistan Liberation Army Declared a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by USA......by KBS Sidhu

What Washington did—and how India should, and should not, respond.

The news: what Washington just did

The U.S. State Department has formally designated the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) and explicitly named its suicide unit, the Majeed Brigade, as an alias.

The statement (dated 11 August 2025) notes that BLA has been a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity since 2019 and highlights recent atrocities, including the March 2025 hijacking of the Jaffar Express that killed 31 people and held hundreds hostage, as well as suicide attacks near Karachi airport and at the Gwadar Port Authority Complex. The designation takes legal effect upon publication in the Federal Register and comes under the Trump Administration, signed by Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

For Pakistan, this is an immediate diplomatic win after sustained lobbying at senior levels, reinforced by two high-profile visits to the United States by its Army Chief, Field Marshal Asif Munir, in recent months. For the BLA, it marks a serious tightening of the net. For India, it is both a test of our consistency on terrorism and an opportunity to speak with clarity for the rights of the Baloch people—without ever romanticising or endorsing violence.

The deal— reciprocity or quid pro quo?

Earlier, when President Trump announced the recent tariff deal with Pakistan, he coupled it with remarks about Pakistan’s crude oil—almost certainly referring to natural gas—and seemed to allude, albeit obliquely, to the prospect of U.S. access to Balochistan’s vast mineral wealth, including copper reserves that make up about 90% of Pakistan’s total.

While it would be speculative to frame this as an outright quid pro quo, the convergence of economic and strategic resource interests cannot be dismissed as a background factor influencing the timing of this designation, even though the insurgency has been simmering for decades.

What an FTO designation actually does

The FTO label is far more than a headline. In practical terms, it:

1) Criminalises “material support”.Money, equipment, training, services and coordinated “expert advice” provided from within U.S. jurisdiction (or by U.S. persons abroad) become prosecutable offences. Even seemingly non-violent support—organising logistics, structured training, specialised services—can fall foul of the law. This sharply raises risk for global enablers who touch the U.S. financial system or platforms.

2) Chokes finance and logistics.

Banks, payment processors, crowdfunding sites and crypto off-ramps will treat BLA/Majeed Brigade and their fronts as toxic. Expect account closures, transaction blocks, domain takedowns, and tighter due-diligence on charities and “issue-advocacy” vehicles that have been used to mask operational spending.

3) Tightens mobility and immigration.

Members, representatives and active facilitators face visa denials, removals, and watch-listing. Travel through third countries that rely on U.S. data feeds becomes riskier.

4) Supercharges investigations.

Law enforcement gains broader investigative tools and charging options. Mutual legal assistance and intelligence sharing with partners often picks up pace once an FTO label is in place.

5) Closes the alias loophole.

By naming the Majeed Brigade as an alias, the designation reduces space for rebranding or splintering to dodge enforcement.

6) Creates international ripple effects.

Like-minded partners often mirror or partially align their own proscriptions, or at least tighten compliance around the designated entity and its ecosystem.

Likely impact on the BLA and its insurgency

Funding and procurement will get harder. Diaspora collections, covert remittances and front-NGO routes will face sharper scrutiny. Procurement of dual-use kit, comms gear and travel documents will be riskier and costlier.

Propaganda and outreach may constrict. Platform moderation will be stricter on accounts that praise, promote or coordinate BLA/Majeed activities. Media interlocutors will grow wary of providing them airtime.

The group may respond with symbolic escalation. Insurgent organisations sometimes attempt “spectacle” attacks to signal resilience after a designation. That risk cannot be dismissed, especially against high-visibility Pakistani or Chinese targets linked to CPEC.

Fragmentation and aliasing pressures increase. Internal disagreements over tactics and money could spur splinters. The alias trap the U.S. has set aims to make that path less useful.

Human-rights concerns will not vanish. The grievances that animate many Baloch—resource extraction without local benefit, enforced disappearances, collective punishments, and denial of meaningful autonomy—are not resolved by designations. Heavy-handed crackdowns can deepen the conflict even as finances are squeezed.

Regional spillovers remain a risk. Cross-border militia dynamics with Iran and the security footprint around Chinese projects remain sensitive. Misattribution or tit-for-tat strikes across borders could widen the arc of instability.

Pakistan’s Narrative and the Risk to India

Pakistan’s military and political establishment has long—albeit without credible evidence—accused India’s external intelligence agency, R&AW, of aiding and abetting violence and insurgency in Balochistan.

The latest U.S. designation of the BLA as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation will give Islamabad yet another lever to push this narrative internationally, seeking to embarrass New Delhi and divert attention from its own human-rights record in the province.

India will need a strong, sustained diplomatic effort, including quiet back-channel communications with key partners, to rebut this charge and prevent its entrenchment in third-party perceptions.

The Indian lens: zero tolerance for terrorism, principled sympathy for Baloch rights

India must be consistent: we oppose terrorism everywhere, without exception. That means welcoming steps that curb groups engaged in suicide bombings, hostage-taking and attacks on civilians—whether in Balochistan, Kashmir or anywhere else.

At the same time, we can be—and should be—sympathetic to the Baloch people. Historically, Balochistan’s absorption into Pakistan was neither a model of free consent nor power-sharing. Since then, the record of rights violations and denial of genuine autonomy has been persistent.

Recognising these facts and speaking for peaceful, democratic articulation of Baloch aspirations does not contradict India’s counter-terrorism stance; it strengthens our moral case and exposes Pakistan’s double standards.

Pakistan has long internationalised Kashmir, often via forums and narratives that downplay its sponsorship of militancy. India need not mimic Pakistan’s destabilisation playbook—but we should methodically highlight Islamabad’s hypocrisy: championing “self-determination” in one geography while crushing it in another, and exporting jihadist violence into India while demanding indulgence for its own internal counter-insurgency excesses.

What India should do (a concrete, actionable line-of-effort)

1) Issue a calibrated public line.

Welcome the U.S. move insofar as it targets terrorism against civilians. In the same breath, affirm India’s solidarity with the Baloch people’s peaceful quest for dignity, rights and fair resource-sharing. Avoid any formulation that can be twisted as endorsement of violent methods or secessionism.

2) Align our legal and compliance posture.

Conduct a rapid review of our domestic terror-listing and financing-of-terrorism frameworks to ensure there are no gaps that could make India look permissive to BLA/Majeed funding or facilitation.

Where necessary, issue clarificatory advisories to banks, payment firms, NGOs, educational institutions and platforms about the legal risks of direct or indirect support.

3) Protect the line between advocacy and abetment.

Publish clear guidance for civil-society groups and academics: criticism of Pakistan’s human-rights record is legitimate; material or coordinated operational support to a designated outfit is not. Offer a regulator-facing helpdesk for edge-cases to prevent over-reach against peaceful activists.

4) Elevate documentation of abuses in Balochistan.

Encourage Indian think tanks, legal clinics and media to rigorously document disappearances, extrajudicial actions, and resource exploitation. Table this evidence in parliamentary debates, Track-1.5 dialogues and human-rights fora—always with an explicit rejection of insurgent violence.

5) Quiet trilateral deconfliction.

Intensify discreet talks with Tehran and key Gulf capitals to prevent cross-border escalations and to firewall our connectivity equities (Chabahar, INSTC) from the Baloch insurgency theatre.

6) Extract reciprocity from partners.

Leverage today’s alignment to seek tighter, coordinated action against Pakistan-based anti-India networks and their fronts. Ask for synchronised platform enforcement against propaganda and financing pipelines that target India.

7) Support peaceful Baloch voices.

Where consistent with law, facilitate safe platforms for non-violent Baloch civil-society actors—research, cultural exchange, scholarships, and testimony-gathering—so the narrative is not monopolised by armed actors or by Islamabad.

8) Strategic communications discipline.

Provide a short Q&A pack to all official spokespeople and principal secretaries:

• Q: Do you support the BLA? — “No. India opposes terrorism everywhere.”
• Q: Do you support the Baloch cause? — “We support peaceful, democratic redress of legitimate grievances and respect for human rights.”
• Q: Are you interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs? — “We advocate universal principles. Pakistan cannot demand indulgence for exporting terror while suppressing them at home.”

What India should NOT do (red lines)

• No covert or overt aid to BLA/Majeed Brigade, its fronts, or any violent splinter.
• No rhetorical indulgence that can be spun as cheering insurgent attacks, especially against civilians or civilian infrastructure.
• No platforming of militant spokespeople under the guise of “balance”.
• No permissive space for fundraising or logistics under charitable covers.
• No equivocation that could dilute India’s long-standing moral high ground on counter-terrorism.

Additional insights: how the battlefield and the boardroom may shift

Operationally: expect the BLA to face higher costs, longer lead times and increased exposure in moving money, people and kit. Some activity may shift to smaller, compartmentalised cells and more rudimentary tactics. Target selection may tilt even further towards symbols of the Pakistani state and Chinese projects to retain visibility.

Financially: compliance teams will widen their screening to aliases, front NGOs and associated individuals. Crypto routes will not disappear, but liquidation into fiat will be riskier and more expensive. The aliasing of the Majeed Brigade tightens the circle.

In the information space: content praising, promoting or coordinating BLA actions will face tougher moderation. Media outlets will grow cautious about giving oxygen to violent actors, even while reporting on rights issues continues.

Politically inside Pakistan: Rawalpindi gains a short-term narrative boost—“Washington is with us on this.” But if the response is mass detentions and collective punishments, the grievance reservoir deepens. A purely kinetic response often yields tactical wins and strategic stalemates.

Regionally: Iran–Pakistan frictions over cross-border militancy make miscalculation possible. China will press for tighter protection of CPEC nodes, potentially drawing deeper Chinese security engagement, which in turn can inflame local resentment.

Integrating our earlier argument with today’s reality

Our earlier stance—keep Balochistan in India’s conscience while refusing to romanticise violence—now has even sharper relevance. The FTO designation narrows the BLA’s international oxygen but does not resolve Baloch political and human-rights questions. India’s line should be unblinking:

• No to terrorism, everywhere and always.
• Yes to rights, dignity and lawful political remedies for the Baloch.
• Expose Pakistan’s double standards methodically, not theatrically.
• Protect India’s credibility and equities through disciplined policy, law and messaging.

Handled with care, this moment allows India to bank a counter-terror dividend, maintain solidarity with the Baloch people, and keep the world’s attention on the real deficit in Balochistan: justice, voice and accountability.