When Bihar Rises: Why Punjab and Maharashtra Must Look Inward, Not Backward...by KBS Sidhu

I recently received a message from a senior Punjab-cadre IAS officer that was as revealing as it was thought‑provoking. He had just returned from Bihar as an Election Observer and noted that the state has seen a surge of capital investment, markedly better power supply, and a rapid expansion of roads and bridges.

On this basis, he anticipated that economic “spin‑offs” are around the corner: industrialisation will gain momentum, consumer demand will deepen, and Bihari workers will increasingly find opportunities at home instead of having to migrate out.

From there, he drew a logical—if somewhat unsettling—conclusion. When Bihar stops “supplying” labour on the old scale, he suggested, industrial and agrarian states like Punjab and Maharashtra, which have long depended on such migrant workers, will face difficulty.

In his view, at least one recent policy “move” may be intended to slow or smooth this transition, so that these richer states have time to organize alternative sources of labour. The message is framed as a practical worry, not a polemic, and that is exactly why it merits a careful response.

What the officer gets right about changing labour flows

There is real insight in the officer’s starting point. It is true that sustained improvements in infrastructure, power and connectivity in historically poorer states shape internal migration patterns over time. As local non‑farm opportunities expand and wages improve, the most vulnerable forms of distress‑driven, seasonal migration tend to ease or change character.

It is also accurate that states like Punjab and Maharashtra have, over decades, built entire segments of their economies—paddy transplantation, harvesting, construction, sections of manufacturing and services—on the availability of migrant labour from Bihar, eastern Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Odisha and elsewhere.

A future in which that flow is less abundant or less desperate will inevitably mean higher labour costs, pressure to invest in technology, and some disruption to familiar business models. In that narrow sense, the officer is right to suggest that “receiving states” need to think ahead.

Where the reasoning needs more nuance

Where the message could benefit from more nuance is in how it imagines this transition. The implied story is very linear: build infrastructure, attract industry, create local jobs, and migration “switches off”. In practice, development more often changes the forms of migration than eliminates it.

As incomes, education and information rise, people may move more confidently and farther—from seasonal rural–rural trips to permanent rural–urban migration, and in many cases to international destinations—rather than simply staying put.

The note also risks overstating Bihar’s uniqueness in the labour equation. Punjab and Maharashtra do not draw workers from a single “tap”; they draw from multiple corridors, and labour markets adjust along several margins—wages, recruitment channels, regions of origin, and technology.

As one source state develops, others may step in; employers experiment with mechanisation; and workers themselves exercise more choice. Recognizing these dynamics does not negate the officer’s concern, but it does suggest that the adjustment story is more complex—and more manageable—than a single on/off switch.

A different way to frame the ethical and federal question

The officer’s message is written from the vantage point of someone responsible for keeping complex state economies running, and that lens naturally highlights the risks to Punjab and Maharashtra.

It is understandable that a serving administrator would think in terms of labour supply, sectoral stability, and the pressures that a tightening labour market can create.

At the same time, there is another legitimate lens: that of citizens in the sending states. For decades, large numbers of people from Bihar and similar regions have migrated not out of choice but out of necessity, because local options were too few or too badly paid.

From that perspective, Bihar’s current investments and improvements are precisely what the constitutional promise of balanced development is meant to deliver.

The policy challenge, then, is less “how do we preserve old labour flows?” and more “how do we ensure both sending and receiving states can adjust in ways that are fair to workers and sustainable for their economies?”.

Punjab and Maharashtra’s real long‑term challenge

If the focus shifts to the medium and long term, a larger vulnerability comes into view for Punjab and Maharashtra: the outflow of their own high‑potential youth.

Both states are seeing substantial numbers of students and professionals leave for other Indian metros and for destinations like Canada, Australia, Europe and North America.

This is especially visible in rural Punjab, where foreign study and migration have become a dominant aspiration, and in urban Maharashtra, where many top graduates gravitate to Bangalore, Delhi‑NCR or abroad.

In that sense, while the officer is rightly attentive to the future of low‑wage migrant labour from Bihar, the more consequential structural risk for his own cadre state may be the steady erosion of its internal talent base. That is not a criticism of his concern, but an invitation to broaden it. The strategic question for Punjab and Maharashtra becomes: how do these states adapt to gradually tighter low‑wage labour markets and become places where their own best young people want to stay and build?

Policy front one: adjusting to tighter low‑wage labour markets

On the labour side, three broad directions stand out. First, allowing wages and conditions to adjust. If workers in Bihar and similar regions are less compelled to leave, Punjab and Maharashtra may need to offer higher pay, safer working environments and basic housing to attract labour—from other states or from their own under‑employed populations. That adjustment is challenging, but not unmanageable.

Second, using labour scarcity as a spur to mechanisation and productivity‑enhancing investment. Punjab’s long record in farm mechanisation can be deepened into precision agriculture, custom hiring centres and better logistics; Maharashtra can accelerate mechanisation in agriculture, infrastructure and manufacturing.

This shifts the emphasis from sheer numbers of workers to better‑trained operators, technicians and supervisors, opening space for local youth if skilling systems keep pace.

Third, investing in vocational education and internal mobility so that young people from distressed rural areas can move into more productive roles within the state rather than defaulting to out‑migration. These are levers fully within state hands; they do not require holding Bihar back.

Policy front two: making home worth staying for

On the talent side, states need to think like innovation ecosystems rather than only like traditional agrarian or industrial economies. That means building dense networks of incubators beyond metros, fostering collaborations between universities and industry, and using public procurement and regulatory flexibility to give local startups real markets and testbeds.

It also means re‑orienting higher education towards domains where future demand lies—artificial intelligence, data, biotechnology, climate and clean‑energy technologies, advanced manufacturing and materials—so graduates see credible, cutting‑edge careers in‑state. Without that, campuses risk becoming way‑stations on the journey out.

Quality of life and governance underpin all this: clean and liveable cities, efficient public services, low everyday corruption and a sense of fairness and opportunity matter enormously to young people deciding whether to stay.

Policy front three: working with, not against, mobility

Finally, some level of outward migration—within India and abroad—is inevitable and often beneficial. The question is whether it becomes a permanent one‑way loss or part of a cycle where skills, capital and networks eventually flow back. States can tilt the balance by building deliberate diaspora networks, creating attractive “return pathways” through visiting roles and short‑term assignments, and encouraging diaspora investment in local ventures and institutions.

This way of thinking does not ask “how do we stop people leaving?”, but “how do we remain connected so that leaving and returning are both realistic options over a lifetime?”.

A gentler conclusion: the right question, a wider frame

Seen generously, the IAS officer’s note is an attempt to puzzle through a genuine structural shift: what happens when states that have historically sent large numbers of workers begin to retain more of them? That is a serious question.

Where the message invites further discussion is in how narrowly it defines the risk and how little it says about adjustment within receiving states themselves.

A more expansive frame would welcome Bihar’s development as part of India’s shared progress, acknowledge that some old labour patterns will change, and focus Punjab and Maharashtra’s energies on three tasks: raising productivity and improving conditions at the lower end of the labour market, making home attractive enough that talented youth see a future there, and treating mobility as something to be shaped and leveraged rather than simply feared.

In that spirit, the officer’s message can be read not as something to be alarmed by, but as a useful starting point—a prompt for a wider, more balanced conversation on how Indian states can all rise together in a federation where workers, and not just state economies, are at the centre of the story.

December 18, 2025